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ABstrAct
This article is about occupational change concerning a non-professional group of Street Level 
Bureaucrats—student aid officials at the Swedish Board for Study Support (SBSS). The aim is to 
describe and analyze changes in their occupational role—their discretional space and working 
conditions under the impact of changed ways to manage public service organizations and new 
information and communication technology.  The SBSS is the sole administrator of student finan-
cial aid in Sweden. Its officials investigate and take decisions about students’ applications and 
repayment of loans.  This work includes interacting with clients via telephone and computer.  These 
officials have to have a certain amount of discretion to interpret and apply rules and regula-
tions on specific circumstances in individual cases. How are their working conditions affected by 
organizational and policy changes in the authority? How is their ability to exercise influence and 
control over their own work performance affected?  The analysis highlights how officials suffer 
from decreased discretion and an increasing routinization in their work.  This is a result of a regu-
latory framework continuously growing in detail together with increasing management control 
based on new information and communication technology.  What remains of discretion is a kind 
of ‘task’ discretion, the ability to do minor technical manipulations of rules in individual cases. Even 
today’s top management seems critical of this development. Besides further automatization and 
reduction of staff an ongoing process of organizational change is therefore also aiming to develop 
officials’ competence and working conditions toward what may be seen as organizational profes-
sionalism, a development of specific occupational skills and a discretion adjusted and subordi-
nated to managerial means and ends.  The analysis rests on data from a research project (2011 
to 2014) about Institutional  Talk. Data sources are qualitative interviews, audio-taped speech 
sequences, observational field notes, and official documents. 
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Introduction
The extensive proliferation of changes and reforms in recent decades concerning the mission and the governance of public service work has led to comprehensive research about consequences for different occupational groups in the sector (e.g. Barton 2008, 
Bejerot & Hasselbladh 2003, Bezes et al. 2012, Evans 2010, Evetts 2009). Much re-
search about how new principles for governance affect occupational roles has focused on 
professional or semi-professional groups, such as doctors, nurses, teachers, and social 
workers (Dahl 2009, Höjer & Forkby 2010, Stenlås 2011). Empirical research about 
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how different ‘non-professional’ public service occupations are exposed to this manage-
rial shift is not as developed. This article is about a non-professional group of Street Level 
Bureaucrats (SLBs). I will describe and analyze changes in their occupational role—in 
their discretional space and working conditions under the impact of changed ways to 
manage public service organizations and new information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT). The empirical case is student aid officials working at the Swedish Board for 
Study Support (SBSS). 
Financial support (grants and loans) for higher education is administered by one 
single public authority in Sweden—the SBSS. Almost a million people received econom-
ic support from SBSS in 2011, and the authority holds repayment claims on people 
who have gone through higher education totaling about 30 billion US dollars. SBSS has 
around 1000 employees. The vast majority of these belong to the group studied here. 
As SLBs these officials handle inquiries and make decisions about support, loans, and 
repayment in individual cases on a daily basis. This requires a certain amount of per-
sonal discretion to make judgments and take action concerning, and in interaction with 
individual clients (Lipsky 1980). 
SBSS, originally a product of a social-democratic welfare regime for improved access 
to higher education, despite social class origin has gone through several changes in the 
last decades. The theoretical point of departure in this article is that the occupational roles 
of public service employees of today first and foremost have to be understood in relation 
to three developmental processes on institutional-level working in interaction. The first 
one is about changes in the welfare regime concerning the commission for authorities and 
their underlying political values. In later decades there has been a gradual but clearly vis-
ible shift here toward a stronger emphasis on economic values, i.e., efficiency and control 
of the expenditure of tax revenues (Power 1997). The second process concerns changes 
in how authorities are governed, changes usually assigned to the umbrella doctrine of 
New Public Management (NPM; Hood 1991, 1995). This has meant implementation of 
managerial tools based on two sometimes contradictory logics: the bureaucracy and the 
market, e.g., increased strictness in rule-following vs. service and flexibility toward the 
‘customer’ (Christensen & Laegreid 2001). The third process concerns the far-reaching 
implementation of new ICT.1 ICT may be used for job enrichment and increased self-
control for employees as well as standardization and increased managerial control of 
work performance. The task here is how it is used in relation to the other two processes, 
and how it does affect the occupational role of the officials studied. This case study of 
SBSS officials may be an illustrative example of how such a reciprocal interaction between 
developments on different institutional levels drives today’s development of the public sec-
tor. We may expect them to be quite similar to those confronting bigger SLB groups, such 
as officials at the Swedish Social Insurance Agency and the Swedish Employment Agency 
(cf. Melander 2013). The fact that SBSS officials are a relatively small group employed by 
one and the same agency may make changes more apparent and easy to view as a whole 
compared to studying bigger and more spread-out groups. 
studying sLBs in Audit society—a theoretical framework 
street Level Bureaucrats
This article is a product of a research project about how civil servants transform for-
mal regulation and develop practical policy in interaction with clients. Lipsky’s (1980) 
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theory about SLBs has here been a natural take-off.2 The concept SLB denotes civil 
servants responsible for mediating between the state’s programmatic policy-making and 
its citizens. This implies certain autonomy and discretion to act—rules and regulations 
must be interpreted and translated from their programmatic format to unique situations 
and applied with consideration for human factors (Lipsky 1980, p. 15). On the basis of 
this discretion they develop practical policy for how formal rules shall be applied in real 
situations. This position as policy-makers interpreting and mediating rules in unique 
cases puts management in a certain position of dependency. Minimizing this dependen-
cy, securing that formal regulation is correctly applied, and arbitrariness on behalf of the 
SLBs are prevented, is a central aim for management (Lipsky 1980, p. 24). How this can 
be done was Lipsky’s task. However, his theory may as well be used from the perspective 
of employees and clients, i.e., to analyze the discretional scope and preconditions for 
developing professional skill and knowledge in finding best solutions for clients (Ellis 
2011, Evans 2013 Johansson 1992). In working with ‘human material,’ giving service in 
interaction with people in need, questions of discretion/control vs. questions of content/
quality in work are intimately related. Experiences of professionalism and quality are 
produced in the process of relational work, in interaction with ‘the other,’ the client, 
patient, etc. These experiences then depend on the freedom of the civil servant to act 
upon knowledge about the client’s needs, desires, and unique circumstances. Reduced 
discretion may therefore be experienced as a hindrance to fulfill high-quality work per-
formance. On the other hand, meaning and quality in work may also be searched for in 
the development of professional know-how in applying rules and regulations correctly. 
How loss of discretion is experienced among different occupational groups may also 
have to do with whether there exists a certain formal knowledge base, and a common 
ethics held by the group. Normally there is a difference here between SLB groups with 
or without status as a profession. The former are normally ascribed a legitimate right, 
and are expected to control how to use their knowledge. The latter, of which the group 
studied here is an example, cannot plead for such a right (Evans 2012). This group may 
in spite of this develop and defend an internal strongly anchored best practice. 
changes in the institutional framework of public service organizations
The Swedish system for study support originates from values and policies of centrality 
in the heydays of the social democratic welfare state. To organize these grants and loans 
as a public service commission for satisfying the growing need for educated labor in a 
rapidly expanding economy was an important motive. However, the system also rested 
on fundamental political values: equal opportunities and access to higher education for 
those with the necessary qualities irrespective of class origin and social status should 
be guaranteed by the state. A strong state should take action on the basis of scientific 
knowledge on macro- as well as micro-level for creating equal life chances for all its 
citizens. Costly public investments in the present were often argued for as strategically 
supporting societal transformation. And, it was often legitimate to use the same kind of 
logic in individual treatment and client work (e.g., ‘if the client is relieved from amortiza-
tion payment the coming months she will be able to build up ability to pay regularly in 
future’). In the end of the eighties but especially after the millennium shift the counter-
paradigm of neo-liberalism has gained a lot of influence. In relation to general public 
policy this means a primacy of instrumental values about cost-efficiency at the expense 
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of others (Hood 1991, p. 11). It rests on values about small government and tax payers’ 
right to know that their money ‘is being spent economically, efficiently, and effectively…’ 
(Power 1997, p. 44). The commission of the state is to uphold the law and the distribu-
tion of resources according to principles of equal justice, not welfarist ideals of social en-
gineering and empowerment of ‘underdog’ individuals or groups. It seems reasonable to 
assume that this value change has made strong imprints on the commission of the SBSS. 
The different means used for governance under the dominance of the neo-liberal 
values described can be referred to as tools of NPM and its above-mentioned logics 
for running public service: the market and the bureaucracy. The former logic brings the 
concept of customer—the client as a buyer in demand of good service. Requirements for 
good service are high accessibility and efficiency in decisions, but also politeness, flexibil-
ity, and treating customers as unique persons. The logic of bureaucracy in certain ways 
contradicts this. It rather brings inflexibility, strictly treating clients on the basis of for-
mal rules and routines. This may lead to certain dilemmas, especially when it comes to 
interaction with clients. Further, a typical measure of the market logic is de-centralized 
responsibility via performance targets and result control. Typical of the bureaucratic 
logic is centralized control via detailed regulation and tight step-by-step measures for 
quality assurance. However, in total NPM has brought a long row of far-reaching con-
trol methods of employee performance most often built on quantitative techniques, e.g., 
standardized performance indicators/targets, increased detail in rules and regulation, 
clearly defined management directives and assignments with highly developed instruc-
tions, strict budget control on every level of the organization, and so forth (Christensen 
and Laegreid 2007, Power 1997). It is often sold-in as a de-centralization but means 
basically centralization in governance, a return from an earlier honored emphasis on 
management by culture, and charismatic leadership to the logics of the old machine bu-
reaucracy, the systemic governance via bureaucratic authority (Weber 1922/1983). This 
time however, it builds on possibilities opened up by new ICT. 
It is important to stress that ICT technology is neutral. It does not lead to a certain 
kind of governance of employees in itself; it is how it is used that matters (Warhurst & 
Thompson 2006). However, the kind of fine-grained quantitative measurements request-
ed by NPM are no doubt facilitated by the powerful tools of new ICT. Research that di-
rectly addresses the connection between ICT and the different NPM measures in public 
service is scarce. Schedler and Scharf (2001), however, when pointing at the reciprocal 
reinforcement of ICT and NPM conclude that the introduction of e-government is a 
strong factor reinforcing the NPM reform. Its apolitical nature eases its introduction 
in comparison with the more ideological nature of NPM. Several authors have stressed 
the enhanced abilities to monitor employee performance via new ICT (Garson 1989). 
The growing dependency of electronic devices for work performance is also important. 
Further, automatization via new media changes conditions for social interaction with 
clients, as well as between employees (Asgarkhani 2007). However, here we have to 
make a distinction between automation and information. The former leads to standard-
ization and obstruction of professional control (powerlessness) while the latter may 
stimulate worker self-control because it enhances the possibility to overview complex 
details (Tummers et al. 2009). Lopéz-Nicolas and Meronõ-Cerdán (2009) make an im-
portant distinction when it comes to information—what they term personalization vs. 
codification of knowledge. Codification means making knowledge generally usable for 
various purposes—converting intellectual knowledge into structural capital. Stored in 
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documents, manuals, databases, electronic repositories, and so forth it becomes inde-
pendent of employees. Personalization on the other hand means a focus on dialogue 
between individuals—a person-to-person approach of sharing knowledge. What they 
call tacit knowledge (implicit knowledge based on experience and praxis) cannot be 
codified; sharing it requires interaction between workers (p. 212). The codification strat-
egy is typical of the hierarchic cultures of bureaucracy. This distinction between differ-
ent strategies for knowledge sharing is vital in the present study: How do the enhanced 
possibilities of informational exchange affect the occupational roles of the officials, and 
the efficiency and treatment of clients?
sLB working conditions in today’s institutional framework
Now, what kind of working conditions may be expected as a result of an institutional 
framework like the one sketched here? As discussed above the question of the discretion 
of SLBs becomes pivotal here. What kind of discretion remains for SLBs to act in ac-
cordance with what is valued as professionalism and high quality in work? We cannot 
presuppose that the ‘regulative explosion’ of today automatically means reduced SLB 
discretion (Evans & Harris 2004). Paradoxically it may sometimes create more of it. The 
wording of rules is always open-textured. They are by necessity vague. There are always 
ambiguities and borderline cases, alternative fields of application, and so forth (Evans & 
Harris 2004). The situations the rule is meant to cover are never identical. Different rules 
may often end up in conflict with each other leading to a need for adjustment, balance, 
and prioritization (Liebling et al. 2011). Taylor and Kelly (2006) discern three different 
forms of discretion: 
1. Value discretion: the ability to act upon norms about professional practice anchored 
in knowledge, experience, and training. 
2. Rule discretion: the ability to interpret and prioritize between vague and contradict-
ing rules and rule systems. 
3. Task discretion: the ability and skill to execute prescribed tasks. Even if these are 
increasingly exposed to control and steering measures, they may be complex and 
demand discretion on street level. 
The authors conclude that a key characteristic of service delivery under NPM systems in 
the UK has been the encouragement of SLBs to use their discretion to reduce the costs 
and improve the quality of service ‘arguably increasing task discretion for professionals 
and helping to create an increased awareness of the cost of services’ (Taylor & Kelly 
2006, p. 633). This process toward a more task-oriented service also implies more of 
skill-based training at the expense of knowledge-based education of some professionals. 
Taylor (2007, p. 560) sees a trend of teachers becoming technicians occupied with teach-
ing skills measured against ‘social efficiency’ while their ‘developmentalist position’ as 
professionals is increasingly being repressed. Ellis (2011) shows how some groups of so-
cial workers adjust to the management logic of governance. The discretional scope for de-
veloping informal practice is severely reduced because of increasing detailiation of rules 
in combination with new ICT systems of control. Rules become tools for self-discipline, 
and the worker becomes a practitioner saluting professionalism in rule-performance, in 
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mastering the rule-system in a technical way (cf. Liljegren 2012). Barton (2008) con-
cludes that performance indicators in social work create an ‘isomorphic approach’ that 
makes professional innovation, assessment, and autonomy disappear.
However, discretion is neither good nor bad per se. Discretion always exists within a 
political and ideological context in which the professional group and other social forces 
operate, and it must be analyzed in relation to that context (Evans & Harris 2004). Un-
der certain circumstances it may be an important professional attribute. In others it may 
serve as something for policy-makers to hide behind and/or provide professionals with 
an opportunity to abuse power. And, of course it must be related to the public policy 
values that are guiding the commission of the authority. Are changes for the actual group 
here developing toward a loss of discretion and an impoverishment of job content, to-
ward narrow specialization, isomorphism and routinization? Or, is transformation from 
one kind of discretion toward another a move toward enhanced qualification in a partly 
different area? Are these changes necessary for improved authority performance?
Data and Method
This article is based on data from a research project on Institutional Talk. The aim was 
to study speech interactions between officials and clients in their institutional frame-
work. The main data source here is 1,400 recordings of telephone calls. These are ana-
lyzed by Conversation Analysis (CA, Heritage & Clayman 2010). A multilevel approach 
for analyzing the transformation from formal to practical policy in professional–client 
interactions is presented in a forthcoming article (Bruhn & Ekström 2014). In this ar-
ticle however, the focus is on the impact of the institutional framework on the scope to 
act for staff and managers. Main data sources used here are qualitative semi-structured 
interviews and official documents (programmatic writings, visions, evaluative reports, 
accounts, and follow-up statistics). Twelve persons were interviewed, eleven of these 
between May 2011 and December 2012. Respondents were chosen on the basis of theo-
retical sampling (position, time in service, gender, education; see Strauss 1987). Five 
ordinary officials at one local office, the chairmen of the two unions’ organizing of-
ficials, and four top managers at Head Office were interviewed. Four interviewees had 
25 years’ experience or more in service. This together with document data gave a good 
picture about the longitudinal change of the authority. A follow-up interview with the 
new GD of the authority was done in February 2014. All quotes from respondents are 
presented with fictitious names. The project speech recordings being carefully analyzed 
for other parts of the project have functioned as a context for validations of facts and 
interview statements, and for comparisons between data. This goes especially for 76 
audio recordings from telephone conversation concerning repayment and repayment 
plans, one of the most critical incidents where officials’ discretion is put to test in daily 
practice. Interviews, documents, the 76 audio recordings, and some observational field 
notes were analyzed using meaning categorization. Basically this means sorting into dif-
ferent themes. Themes were constructed in dialogue between data and theory, i.e., some 
grew out of data, others on the basis of theoretically established concepts (Layder 1998). 
Analysis rests on a hermeneutical approach interpreting data by a conscious use of dif-
ferent theoretical perspectives (Kvale & Brinkmann 2008). For handling data, qualita-
tive software NVivo (10) was used. 
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the case—some short facts 
When data collection in this project started, SBSS had one Head Office and 13 local of-
fices located in areas with institutions of higher education, and one Call Center located 
in a small northern town. Head Office houses top management and different support 
departments, e.g., HR, Statistics, ICT. Every local office had a manager, some also had 
group managers; 65 per cent of the employed officials were women; mean age of the 
employees was 43.5 years. Staff turnover was low. An academic degree was not a for-
mal requirement for this position. However, the amount of staff with such degrees has 
always been quite high. Staff has two union alternatives: a minority belongs to Jusek, 
a member of the umbrella organization for university graduates (SACO). The majority 
(even several academics) belongs to ST, a part of the organization for white collar work-
ers (TCO). 
During the time of our study a new General Director (GD) was employed. In con-
nection with her taking office an extensive organizational change of the authority was 
initiated. Since then, three local offices have been closed down, and staff has decreased 
from 1100 to 900.
sBss officials—occupational roles in a changed institutional framework
Disposition 
In the first two sections of the analysis below I will describe general changes in the au-
thority’s commission as well as organization since the late 1980s. In the following six 
sections I will deal systematically with how ICT and applied managing techniques affect 
the occupational role of the officials. In a final section I will briefly discuss the new pro-
cess of organizational change initiated by the new GD. 
the erosion of former welfare values and its impact on  
the commission of the authority 
The successive shift in Swedish public sector policy from the ideals of a socio-liberal 
welfare regime to a neo-liberal one has made clear imprints on the commission of SBSS. 
Today an all-embracing focus on economic efficiency is dominating. Several respondents 
point to today’s strictness in collecting loans, taking measures against cheaters, and 
hunting down those who try to be unreachable. 
… that we’ve gone from having a great deal of concern for the client… that above all we 
encourage helping people and want to prioritize service… and there’s no end to it… to a 
situation with a whole lot of ‘the money must be paid back,’ ‘Wrong payments may never 
occur,’ eh, ‘hunt cheaters all over the world’…//… There’s clearly been a shift in culture 
which quite a lot of people have had greater or lesser problems with. Because it hasn’t felt 
like… well, we’ve lost our concern for the client, they’ve put in more of this stuff about: 
So, what does it mean to be a public servant? Well, you’re actually handling the citizens’ 
money and you should protect it. (Lennart, top manager, many years in service)
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This change of priorities is reflected in the official catchwords of the authority. As one 
of the first signs of ‘a new era,’ the concept of ‘customer’ was introduced at the end of 
the 1980s. The official catchword then was ‘A reckless investment in service.’ A further 
step was expressed from 2000 onward: ‘Loans shall be repaid.’ As a kind of synthesis, 
today’s catchword is somewhat more down-tuned: ‘SBSS makes studying possible.’ The 
transformation may be seen, though of course in a simplified way, as a journey from an 
institution for social support to a loan institute, and the latter term is often used in inter-
action with clients as a reason for not being able to fully consider the client’s situation. 
An important side of changes in commission profoundly anchored in the value-
change of the welfare state is the decreasing number of areas of support handled by the 
authority. In the 1980s and 1990s the student aid local offices were very much players in 
the development of local labor market policy. As such the authority had several different, 
sometimes parallel support forms and rule-systems to operate with, forms for support-
ing labor force re-education. This situation with many support forms and rule-systems 
in a way peaked at the millennium shift. At that time the Social Democratic government 
invested heavily in the so-called Kunskapslyftet (app. Knowledge lift)—an extensive in-
vestment program in adult education. This was a strenuous period for the SBSS, and the 
authority got a lot of bad publicity for too long turnaround times. In the aftermath of the 
program the role of SBSS was radically changed toward more of strict loan business spe-
cializing first and foremost on aid to students going through the regular higher education 
system. Thus, the number of alternative systems for aid decreased, and the ones left started 
to develop toward higher detailiation and regulative complexity. The role as labor market 
player was more or less abolished. At the same time efficiency in execution of customer 
cases was enhanced very notably, something that also has to be related to an organiza-
tional change heavily dependent on the introduction of new ICT on a broad scale. 
the impact of regulative development and new Ict on  
organizational change 
It is important to note that hand-in-hand with the change in commission toward a ‘loan 
institute’ goes the primacy of economistic values about cost-efficiency as the central 
aim for public service governance (Hood 1995). The overall efforts of rationalization 
and strivings toward productivity and cost-efficiency are clearly the basic aim behind 
changes in internal working conditions and organizational change in SBSS.
You can tell, you know… You can tell because… We get, we’ve got, less freedom, that is, 
we’re not able to apply flextime on, when it’s, under high pressure. We’ve had more to, 
well, we can’t run faster, but we can do… Well we can work fast and efficiently, but we 
may not be able to do it faster, but we’re supposed to do, the things we do, we’re supposed 
to do more efficiently. If we can do, open one window with two mouse-clicks or less, then 
we should do it… (Tommy, 5 years in service) 
Of great importance concerning the organizational development of SBSS is that it was es-
tablished as a single authority in 1991 out of 24 local authorities for support of adult edu-
cation, six student aid authorities, and one central authority for advice and surveillance. 
However, despite efforts to integrate these different local office cultures and work practices 
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a certain heterogeneity lived on for several years, partly because of the above-mentioned 
existence of a division of labor based on the different parallel systems for aid to administer, 
partly because local managers were able to maintain a great deal of autonomy to develop 
their local office organization. Local offices mostly worked toward their own region in the 
decades before the millennium shift. As mentioned, they were often working together with 
other local authorities such as the employment agency, the social insurance office, mu-
nicipalities, and the university. This meant that officials often attended dialogue meetings 
with study counselors, employment officials, and so forth trying to solve issues of support 
for individual applicants. When cases of student aid applications could not be treated in 
a routine way the official usually met the applicant face-to-face. To solve such cases by 
phone conversation was utterly rare. However, changes started to grow successively with 
the implementation of both new technical devices (e.g., computers) and organizational 
solutions (e.g., phone answering hours). 
Today centralization of the authority has gone much further and work organization 
is radically different. Business is run by telephone, e-mail, and IT/Web independent of 
local anchoring in offices. The latter have become a kind of historical remnant. Local 
receptions are closed down. Every office is specialized on one or sometimes two types 
of tasks (e.g., repayment of loans, loan applications) working on a national scale; 80 
per cent of applications for student aid are automatically processed. From 2012 all ap-
plications are done via the Web, no paper forms are used anymore. Most measures are 
expected to be taken by the web-savvy customers themselves. Customer alternatives for 
contact are e-mail and telephone. Phone calls go initially to the front office. The vast 
bulk of these are handled by the Call Center. Those are normally about general informa-
tion, giving help with easy questions. The more complex calls go to officials with special 
competence in back office. Because local offices are responsible to back-up the Call Cen-
ter taking front office calls every official occasionally has to do a couple of hours’ duty 
in the front office position besides a couple of hours in back office position. This means 
a normality of 2–4 hours phone work per day. In periods of high customer pressure the 
phone shifts may be doubled. The main activity besides phone work is to administer 
and investigate customer cases. Even though decisions in individual cases are in the end 
taken by one single officer, several officers may be involved, taking minor steps during 
the process of investigation. Every case is open for every official, and when applicants 
phone up they are connected to whichever official is available. In several cases the offi-
cial recently had to consult the ‘specialist’ before deciding. Specialists were colleagues on 
local office level with extra and deeper competence in the field. In difficult cases officials 
also could get help from a support unit at Head Office. However, in the new ongoing or-
ganizational change both local specialists and the support unit have disappeared. Finally, 
clients are able to appeal decisions at The National Board of Appeal for Student Aid, 
which has jurisdiction to abolish SBSS decisions. A growing number of precedent-setting 
cases from this board contribute to an increase in regulation. 
Officials: a de-coupling from the local context and a  
de-personalized relationship with clients
As described in the previous section managers as well as individual officials in ‘the old 
days’ used to have space for taking part in local processes, working out collaborative 
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agreements about local labor market ventures besides working with individual cases. 
In this case for example, and especially for local offices occupied with adult education 
(originally 24 out of 30 offices), it could be about re-education of a certain individual or 
group of workers becoming un-employed because of a factory closing down. The role of 
the officials here was to help finding solutions in the different rule systems for the atten-
dants’ financial support. All in all, the more intricate individual cases of student support 
were always solved in close co-operation on a local level. In the case of a student that had 
not reached the stipulated university points for getting further financial support for in-
stance, decisions were taken in dialogue with a study counselor. How to handle a student 
with problems of re-paying a loan was often decided in dialogue with a social secretary. 
It’s been like that for, it’s been like that, well, for, for a very long time, maybe since before 
2000 roughly. Back then, we had a consulting group together with representatives from 
the university, back then we were called X university. We had consulting groups and for a 
while there we also had one for municipal adult education students, but that wasn’t quite 
in the same way. Then, it was with some study counselor, some welfare officer and it was 
preferred, not that they had any right to decide, because that was still up to us, but they 
could add their… (Anne, 24 years in service) 
This quote has two important implications in relation to competence and discretion. 
First, personalized local networks of officials with different jurisdiction and competence 
enhance the space for influence and power. Second, together with a much more ‘loose’ 
regulation the possibility to know and act upon all ‘facts’ in unique cases was bigger. 
Today however, geographical location has nothing to do with work performance. A de-
coupling from the local context is here an aspect of a more general de-personalization 
of the relationship with clients (and other external actors). An earlier type of client work 
with elements of personal relation building has now been replaced by superficial and 
de-personalized relations for efficient service delivery to anonymous customers. Officials 
use computer technology and telephone communication as working tools. On the one 
side this means being tied physically to working in stations with computer screens and 
telephone headsets. On the other it means being dependent on web-based information, 
investigation tools, and web forms. A phone conversation starts with the official logging-
in to the customer’s personal web page, reading facts in the case before being able to 
discuss it. This reading is necessary due to the lack of relationship, and because measures 
may have been taken by other officials. The strategy behind the use of ICT here is obvi-
ously about making knowledge accessible and usable throughout the whole organiza-
tion. Making the investigation process in every single case ‘open’ makes the customer 
independent of single officers. Every official available may take decisions in the process. 
That several officials may be involved in this way does not mean taking decisions in 
dialogic networks. It means, however, that they often must check up, and take decisions 
on the basis of work done by colleagues. Further, that different officials make contribu-
tions in the processing of individual cases makes each official more distant to the unique 
client, than if cases were referred to and handled by one and the same official (direct 
phone numbers are not normally given to clients). This restricts the possibility to ‘see’ 
and consider special conditions, and it may strengthen clients’ views of officials as face-
less bureaucrats. On the other hand, some clients may value the efficiency of not having 
to ‘hunt down’ a particular officer in order to get their case dealt with. Most respondents 
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do not seem to perceive this as a problem in the relationship with clients. However, what 
becomes clear from a lot of our audio recordings is that several customers/clients get 
irritated when having to recapitulate and explain their situation to a ‘new’ official ‘on 
and on.’ Together with the front- and back office system this may trigger feelings of be-
ing bounced between different officials. And, it is a strong indication of the fragmented 
relationships that prevail nowadays between officials and their customers. Besides being 
a target for this kind of irritation several respondents pointed to the satisfaction and 
experience of meaning in work when they get the time, decisional space, and ability to 
help a customer in a tough and complicated situation:
I:  Which of your tasks do you find most rewarding then? What, what’s most fun to work 
with?
R:  That’s probably, well, it sounds horrible, but the ones who have difficulties paying 
(laughs). 
I: Oh, okay. No, that’s not horrible at all, if you think about it.
R:  But to try to, that one can help and how one can make things easier and what, what 
one can do to… Maybe not paying that much or divide it or… that it’s not impossible, 
that one can help. (Kristina, 7 years in service) 
A final aspect of de-personalization is the ICT in itself. Simply using e-mail and tele-
phone to interact with customers, rather than meeting physically, creates distance and 
reification of the other in relations. This has been thoroughly outlined by several sociolo-
gists (Collins 2004: 47 pp., Turner 2002).
Automatization—standardization of work via technology
As mentioned previously, all applications are done by the applicants themselves via the 
Web. The vast majority of applications are processed automatically. The driving force 
behind is of course higher cost-efficiency. However, it also may be assumed as contrib-
uting to job enrichment because officials are being liberated from sorting, registration, 
and classifying simple cases. Most respondents do not seem to miss the handling of 
un-complicated applications. However, some say that performing simple routine work 
now and then gives opportunities to relax, and that it counteracts stress. Obviously 
automatization also creates some worries about vulnerability, de-personalization and 
future staff reduction:
I:  Do you see any disadvantages then, with the automatization?
R:  Yes, if it becomes too automated, of course, fewer officials might be needed. Also, it 
becomes rather impersonal and we become quite vulnerable, in case there’s trouble 
with the computer.
I:  Yes, if there’s trouble…
R:  We’ll be very vulnerable if there’s too much automatization and not enough staff. 
That’s what I think. (Lena, 7 years in service) 
However, there is an interesting paradox here: the automatization of processing simple 
cases leaves only the complicated and challenging ones for officials to handle. At the 
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same time though, ICT is used to standardize the work process in these latter cases. 
Obviously tools and technical support systems (forms with squares and limited numbers 
of alternatives that lead the investigator, mathematic devices that help counting, and 
so forth) make the instrumental side of work faster. These tools standardize work and 
circumscribe alternative investigator decisions. ICT use in SBSS is a clear example of 
codification—storing knowledge, converting intellectual property into structural capital. 
A precondition for this is a regulative framework that narrows down investigator discre-
tion. This is felt by respondents: 
R:  Unfortunately it’ll become much more regulated. We won’t have the same ability to act 
as we’ve had before and… There will be clearer guidelines and more boring guidelines. 
I:  Stress as well?
R: Well… Well I don’t know, but above all there will be more routine-…
I:  Routine tasks. That’s a bit of a paradox, if they at the same time, just when you’ve got 
rid of those real routine tasks…
R: Yes, exactly. (Tommy, 5 years in service)
Thus, automatization means removal of simple routine business. Only the more compli-
cated cases, those that demand more of skill and knowledge remain. However, the recent 
development indicates that the processing of these becomes more routinized because of 
‘codification’ and increasing detailed regulation. 
centralization—standardization of work via increased detail in regulation 
The former era of parallel and often quite vague rule systems has now come to an end. 
Significant of today’s regulative system is that it is a uniform and integrated one continu-
ously growing in detail to encompass all possible types of alternative solutions that may 
be of actuality in different cases. Hand-in-hand with this goes a centralized control of 
how the system is applied in practice made possible by different ICT measures (see be-
low). A former quite decentralized organization in the 1990s with quite extensive local 
office autonomy has become centralized. Today what remains of such local autonomy 
are some questions about internal organization and staff recruitment, and even this is 
decreasing. 
…what they do operatively is strictly managed. There are regulations for how many emails 
one should handle, how many calls one should take, what type of cases one should do, 
in what order one should take the phone shifts, there are directives about all this stuff. 
(Lennart, top manager, many years in service) 
The increasing detailiation complemented with distinct instructions for each type of 
case narrows the scope for officials to evaluate and take action on the basis of a well-
developed knowledge of the complexity of unique cases. 
In July 2010 the rules became more rigorous, when it comes to examining results, yes (for 
the right to get support and loan, my remark). And it was then that it all became more 
rigorous, that you needed certificates, that is, it should be correct in terms of time and that 
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we should only look at their latest period of receiving study aid. Before that we could go 
further back in time and check, if their average was okay, that meant it was a temporary 
slump and we were content if the prognosis looked good, that something had happened 
and they, people felt better and one could assess… But now it’s just, well, one checks: Has 
something happened and what’s happened and is it verified, period. So it’s, it feels a bit 
cynical, somehow, in my opinion. (Anne, 24 years in service) 
This quote also highlights how the concept of service is understood and applied in 
SBSS today. Giving good service is not about good personal meetings, listening-in, and 
considering unique aspects of unique cases. It is about quick answers to give the cus-
tomer all available alternatives to choose among, if there are any. All officials shall act 
in the same way. To consider individual deviations is a threat to the safety of uniform 
treatment. 
The rigorous regulation of today and the decrease of parallel rule systems do not 
seem to be experienced by officials as easier to handle, clearer, and more manifest maybe, 
but not easier. In combination with different control measures it also seems to be creat-
ing a kind of unsafety to act, i.e., a fear of doing the wrong thing. Even management 
seems to experience that an increasing number of directives and a growing detail in 
regulation may lead to lack of safety in the occupational role:
H… instead things have developed in such a way that we’ve come this far in the quality 
assurance work and have cut back when it comes to assuring the quality of the actual rules 
and regulations, instead it has… instead you get the feeling that it might have inhibited the 
administrators when it comes to thinking more freely.
C. They don’t dare make decisions.
H.  They’ve become so controlled by wanting to do things the right way. (Hedvig and 
Carin, HR Managers) 
Hand-in-hand with automatization and regulative detailiation goes a decreasing amount 
of opportunities for exchange of experiences and knowledge in collegial dialogue (cf. 
Lopéz-Nicolas & Meronõ-Cerdán’s (2009) concept of personalization of knowledge 
above). Arenas for local and collegial support, discussions and consultations, group ses-
sions, and so forth, about tricky cases has almost disappeared:
No, not anymore. Before we had joint, even if it was the specialist who made the deci-
sion, together with an administrative official, we had joint meetings where we discussed 
things… But that was probably before the rule system became more regulated, because the 
only ones, we handle mostly in this result examination, that’s the ones who don’t have suf-
ficient study results, and, and that’s so strict nowadays, so there’s not as many possibilities, 
as there used to be,. (Anne, 24 years in service) 
So, even if officials work with ‘open cases,’ i.e., different officials may take action in the 
same single cases during the process, they work very much in isolation from each other 
nowadays. The lack of collective support in developing work practice can be seen as an-
other decrease in discretion as well as a loss of quality in work because it deprives them 
of abilities to deepen their knowledge by sharing experiences with others (cf. Amble 
2013). 
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Increased openness for monitoring and control of work performance
No doubt the Web and the intranet provide tremendous opportunities for controlling 
and integrating the workflow in the organization. Information, rules, and regulations 
are accessible to both staff and clients. All steps taken by individual officials are open 
for monitoring by management. The kind of unsafety in case handling discussed above 
must of course be understood also in relation to this. Officials seem fully aware of the 
transparency of their work: 
R:  Yes (laughs). But sure, sometimes you wonder, being controlled all the time and they 
know exactly what you do and for how long you’re on a break after a call and how 
many cases you’ve done, because it’s measured all the time, and, and then they say ‘Yes 
but we don’t look at that, we only look at groups,’ but…
I: Yeah, because they compare offices. 
R:  Yeah, but then you hear, when people talk, that you can’t know certain things unless 
you’ve been in to check up on the individual (laughs) so it, it happens and it’s probably 
been like that everywhere but it… Then again, I don’t know, as long as I don’t have 
anything to hide I guess they can look (laughs). (Lena, 7 years in service)
Officials take decisions about quite large sums of money, and they know that every 
step they take is open for control by management and other officers. This creates a 
self-disciplinary way of always checking up on measures taken by themselves and other 
colleagues, re-counting sums calculated by the computer, and so forth. This kind of self-
control guarantees correctness and uniformity (isomorphism) in case handling. At the 
same time though, it may create insecurity and inefficiency, something that can be quite 
annoying even for management: 
…while we’ve ended up in an investigation culture that sometimes, how should I put it,.. is 
counterproductive because, to many people, investigation means checking. I check with a 
colleague, I check the system, I check once again that my calculations are correct… which 
makes it… when we think of an investigation we think, well I’m performing an evaluation 
and make use of the mass of information to reach a decision. But it often ends up being 
a question of ‘Suppose I check this’ ‘now I’ve checked that’ ‘and now I’ve checked that’… 
it’s like there’s a kind of a mismatch about the image of what it means to investigate. So 
we’re working quite a bit with training in investigation methodology and case-handling 
templates and investigation templates and all kinds of things. (Lennart, top manager, many 
years in service) 
Governing work via quality measures and performance indicators
The authority uses a great number of follow-up measures to gain information about 
organizational performance. Annual reports reveal a multitude of operative goals (e.g., 
maximum three minutes in the telephone queue, a maximum of three weeks processing 
time for each case, 70–75 telephone calls per day at the call center, etc.). Results are eval-
uated through tight follow-ups (e.g., number and types of decisions, economic results, 
etc.). An extensive yearly survey also investigates customers’ rate of satisfaction with 
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service. Other quality measures include managers listening-in on officials’ telephone in-
teraction, manager–co-worker developmental dialogues, case evaluation improvement 
seminars, and recurrent risk assessment. 
The multitude of performance targets are, as mentioned above, according to man-
agement, only goals at organizational and local office level. However, this has resulted 
in some heated discussions between offices concerning different arguments of quantity 
versus quality. Criticism is directed toward Head Office for only presenting how many 
cases are dealt with in each office, how many are pending, and so forth. Especially staff 
at local offices with weak quantitative results in these comparisons (e.g., case handling) 
raises claims about the need to look into cases to evaluate the quality in processing. An 
answer from management concerning this type of criticism has been suggestions about 
developing measurement further. 
… and this has spurred the employer to say ‘Alright, now we must measure everything,’ 
and then it’s underway…//…….. But then they say ‘okay but now we must help individu-
als,’ we can need help. In order to get competence development and support, personal 
performance must be measured. So now we’re at that level. (Kurt, union representative 
30 years in service) 
Several respondents expressed worries that such tight following up sooner or later will 
reach individual level. 
R:  They don’t measure time sequences now and they don’t keep track on how many 
cases someone does per person, like that, but it is underway. I don’t have a problem 
with it, so to speak, I think it could be a good thing to see, if there’s… The thing is, 
there could be people who do two cases a day, or per hour, but they do them bril-
liantly, and then there may be a person who… does seventeen cases per hour, but 
who makes fifteen mistakes (laughs). If we had, or sixteen mistakes, that’s not, very 
good, that’s not good. So to find a solution, how one should work, it might be good, 
but… Now we have less freedom, so to speak, in terms of, stuff, and it has become 
more regulated, how one should do, when one is allowed to leave, when one, those 
things, that… One feels like, don’t you trust us to do our job? (Tommy 7 years in 
service)
Development of staff
It should be emphasized that initiatives of educational efforts are mostly taken on local 
manager level, with the HR department in an advisory and supportive role position. 
Differences between the numbers of local office initiatives for competence development 
have until today been quite large. Roughly speaking, management tries to develop the 
skills of officials along two lines. The first is to make the single officer a skilled ser-
vice provider (via quality measures). Here, tools used are the above-mentioned manager 
listening-in on telephone calls, management–co-worker dialogues, etc., types of initia-
tives very much depending on aspirations among local managers. The second is to in 
accordance with task specialization develop officials’ competence on regulation in their 
special field of competence. 
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A new GD and a new large-scale organizational change 
In 2011 a new GD took office. After a period of investigation she initiated an extensive 
process of organizational change starting in 2012. One explicit goal of this still ongoing 
process is to accumulate enough capital for heavy investments in a new IT system for 
living up to government goals of service deliverance; to establish a more uniform and 
functional managing system; and to develop the work roles of coworkers in different 
parts of the organization. The latter concerns both development of competence and a 
change of work organization. An early result of this process of change has been the clos-
ing down of three local offices and a staff reduction from about 1100 to 900. 
The continuing venture on ICT is aiming to further enhance automatization by 
opening up the system to an even greater degree than today for customers to handle 
their own cases in a less time-consuming way. Cases that cannot be handled in this way 
are expected to be very few in future. In relation to these few tricky cases, the GD wants 
to ‘recreate’ the investigator. She expresses dissatisfaction with how the work role of of-
ficials has gone through a de-generation in the last decade: 
Lots of administration but not much investigation. If one should try to make a distinc-
tion. This doesn’t mean that our officials can’t investigate, but it is very much of … 
administration today. We need…//…need to get a change there and we believe this very 
much affects work environment, possibilities for individual development and the like, 
that one can create more of actual… investigating instead of putting figures in … tick 
off things in squares. 
Working with only a few, more complicated cases and through the whole process will 
re-personalize the relation between the official and the customer, and it will raise the 
need for officials’ competence. 
Yes, I want to create working conditions where co-workers do more of what is…investi-
gating, analyzing, … in other words using their intellectual potential. And if so, some of 
them will need some development to be able to do this. 
One step in increasing levels of competence in the organization is academization. From 
now on, an absolute condition for being employed as an official is a formal bachelor de-
gree, however not a specific one. At the same time she announces extensive investments 
in competence development for already employed staff. A further step here is the special-
ization of both local offices and officials in only one area of work tasks and competence, 
instead of the formerly expected two. 
It is clear that the vision behind the organizational change now being in its first 
phase is increased automatization. Case processes will to an even greater extent than 
today be handled by customers themselves via a more user-friendly and transparent 
ICT system. At the same time the new GD wants to develop customer service by profes-
sionalizing the position of officials making them able to increase quality in the more 
complicated cases where special expertise is needed. Involvement in team-based dia-
logues about how rules shall be applied in practice and making small inquiries followed 
up by initiatives for rule development and change will, if realized, probably lead to an 
increased task discretion. Time will tell. 
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conclusive discussion 
In this article the changes of the occupational role of SBSS officials have been analyzed as 
a result of three important macro-level forces of change working simultaneously in later 
decades: the successive erosion of certain central values of a former welfare regime; the 
introduction of new principles for governing public businesses; and the breakthrough of 
new ICT on a broad scale. 
Over a time span of two–three decades changes in policy and values forming the 
basis for this occupational role have meant a change from being one with strong ele-
ments of social support to being an administrator in a loan institute. This has also meant 
a deprivation of one, probably highly appreciated part of the former role—that of being 
a local labor market player in cooperation with representatives of other authorities and 
often on the basis of substantive relations with clients. De-coupling from a local context 
and the de-personalized relationship with clients’ create reification and estrangement 
between officials and clients, something that with few exceptions is experienced as an 
impoverishment of job content (cf. Asgarkhani 2007, Collins 2004, Turner 2002). 
NPM principles for governing public businesses implemented with the help of the 
powerful tools of new ICT are the means behind changes. The different control mea-
sures of NPM based on principles about detailed regulation, step-by-step quality checks, 
performance indicators, and tight follow-up of results would not be possible without 
the new technology. Automatization (Tummers et al. 2009), codification of information 
(Lopéz-Nicolas & Meronõ-Cerdán 2009), being restricted to standardized forms and 
computer devices, and the different self-regulating mechanisms that come with the trans-
parency and openness for control (Garson 1989), here stimulate the kind of ‘isomorphic 
approach’ in the processing of cases discussed by Barton (2008). At the same time an 
increased specialization is going on between groups of officials (and offices), i.e., only 
one type of tasks for each official. Automatization means rationalization: routine tasks 
being taken over by machinery. This has already resulted in reduction of staff. Most of 
the officials left probably appreciate the loss of such routine work thanks to ICT. How-
ever, at the same time, technology together with standardization and detailed regulation 
has meant a routinization of cases that still has to be handled manually. The room for 
qualitative assessments has decreased while demands on formal correctness and step-by-
step following of detailed rules in investigations have increased. As the new GD states 
officials have become administrators instead of investigators. 
What becomes obvious when following Taylor and Kelly’s (2006) distinction be-
tween value, rule, and task discretion is that programmatic aims at political and mana-
gerial level have been successively narrowed. The supremacy of goals about economic 
efficiency narrows the space to act in accordance with for instance empowerment of 
clients in weak positions. Concerning rule discretion the number of systems regulat-
ing different alternative support forms has decreased considerably after the millennium 
shift. What is left, and what even may have increased to some degree is task discretion. 
First, because of increasing detail of rules, cases may in a way become more compli-
cated. More aspects of the case have to be investigated. This may open up opportunities 
for skilled officials to manipulate decisions in single cases on a more technical level. 
Some respondents and several audio recordings of speech sequences bear witness about 
how officials by for example integrating repayment plans and merging different loans 
are able to lower the client’s financial burden. Second, a rigorous rule-following may 
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sometimes contradict being experienced as a good service deliverer by customers. This 
dilemma may sometimes create a space for flexibility, a space for bending rules in the 
name of good service. Third, ICT means possibilities of looking up big amounts of data 
in a short time. Quite likely this means an increasing control of all possible alternatives 
of action at hand (e.g., finding precedential cases, exceptions from certain rules). How-
ever, other things point in the other direction: the transparency of the ICT system used in 
SBSS work toward self-regulation and isomorphism in action, a fear of doing the wrong 
thing which also is likely to create a drag for taking new initiatives. And, the lack of 
collective dialogue and support in developing interpretations of rules and practical poli-
cies also narrows discretional scope. When interaction between colleagues is first and 
foremost taking place digitally in the way described here it seems to work more toward 
control and conformity than support for creative development. 
All in all, the last two decades have meant increased routinization and decreased 
discretion for officials. In the backdrop of this development today’s management strat-
egy behind the ongoing organizational change becomes clear. More types of now routin-
ized work tasks should be taken over by expanded and upgraded computer machinery. 
This is obviously an aim with the planned investments in ICT. However, there are always 
some complicated cases. These shall be taken care of by a smaller workforce of highly 
skilled and competent officials with capabilities of making well-grounded assessments. 
Hand-in-hand with automatization and a decreasing labor force one therefore may ex-
pect a professionalization of ‘the ones left’—a re-skilling of their occupational role, at 
least in relation to the routinization that has taken place since the millennium shift. 
It will then be a professionalization toward expanded task discretion based on solid 
knowledge on rule technicalities in combination with social competence in giving service 
to customers, a professionalism developed on the basis of a bureaucratic logic closely 
connected to the stated organizational aims and needs of this public service organization 
(cf. Evetts 2011, 2013). 
On societal level then—is the result of the above described development improved 
public service in the area of student aid? The answer to this question has to be related 
to the values guiding public service of today. Cost-efficiency and effective service/dis-
tribution of strictly defined loans, grants, and allowances are central in this neo-liberal 
context. In relation to this the answer should be ‘yes.’ Facts and figures point in the 
same direction; in all normal (un-problematic) cases the SBSS of today is very efficient 
in handling its tasks. Service to customers in this context shall be understood as based 
on instrumental rationality—fast and safe delivery of goods demanded. It is not about 
relational work and personal treatment—listening-in, being flexible, considering and 
adjusting to unique conditions. In all normal cases we may expect that clients/customers 
experience SBSS as an effective service deliverer. In relation to the more problematic ones 
however, some doubts may be raised. And, if we relate to nowadays down-tuned welfare 
values about equality, supporting ‘the underdog,’ stimulating labor market development, 
and so forth, the answer may be different. 
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End notes
1  The abbreviations here SBSS—SLB—NPM—ICT will be used throughout the article. In 
the same way I will use ‘official’ denoting the occupational group studied, and alternate 
between ‘client’ and ‘customer’ when talking about the person’s official work.
2  The project is funded by the Swedish Research Council. 
